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Abstract
This paper develops a simple dynamic general equilibrium model of
an agricultural economy, in which poor farmers borrow wheat from rich
farmers to invest on their land.  Because wheat output is stochastic
(we allow for both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks), there may be
default ex-post.  We compare equilibria in this economy with and
without political intervention. Intervention is decided through
majority voting and can take the form of a bailout or a moratorium. The
results of our formal analysis are confronted with historical evidence
from the Panic of 1819 in the United States. With no aggregate
uncertainty, the main results of the formal analysis are that allowing
for debt moratoria and bailouts not only always improves ex-post
efficiency but may improve ex-ante efficiency. Anticipated bailouts
always occur in equilibrium and moratoria never occur, but the threat
of moratoria enhances efficiency. With aggregate uncertainty, the
differences between moratoria and bailouts may collapse, with both
occurring only in bad times and with both improving ex-ante efficiency.
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Introduction
Throughout much of the history of the United States, states passed laws
providing for debt moratoria and for other forms of debtor relief
(Rothbard,
1962, Domowitz and Tamer, 1997). During the Great Depression, states
passed laws for debt moratoria of farm mortgages. To further improve
farm income, the Roosevelt administration moved to devalue the dollar
against gold.  Devaluation would have triggered the gold clauses then
present in almost $100 billion of outstanding private debt and most
likely would have triggered a wave of corporate bankruptcies. Congress,
however, abrogated all gold payment clauses, relieving debtors of $69
billion of additional payments generated by the devaluation
(Kroszner,1998). In recent times, bankrupt industrial firms and
financial institutions have been the beneficiaries of bailouts or3
government takeovers. In this paper, we model ex post political
intervention in debt contracts in a democracy.
Firms or individuals fail either as a result of firm-specific
factors, such as incompetent management or failed product designs, or
as a result of macroeconomic factors that are correlated across firms.
The motivation for ex post political intervention is to correct for
incomplete contracts and to remedy possible externalities that arise
when there are many simultaneous failures in a downturn in the economy.
Allowing for ex post intervention, however, influences interest rates
and the volume of lending ex ante. Ex ante, are there benefits to
having political institutions that permit ex post intervention in debt
contracts?
We address this question in a two-period model. We consider in
turn the case of an economy without and with aggregate shocks. In each
case, we first characterize equilibrium in our economy in the absence
of political institutions that permit ex post intervention.  Then we
analyze the properties of the equilibrium when debt moratoria or
bailouts can be declared y a majority or super-majority vote of the
citizens.  We find not only that political intervention can improve the
allocation of resources in the second period but also that the
anticipation of intervention can, surprisingly, increase lending and
improve the allocation of resources in the first period.  We end by
confronting the model with the historical evidence from the Panic of
1819.
The Model
To model debt and default, we require three periods: t=0,1,2.
•  At t=0  Borrowing, lending, and investment occur.
•  At t=1  A first set of production flows is realized. Borrowers
repay or default. In the case of default, lenders make a
continuation or liquidation decision. At the end of period 1, some
borrowers may become laborers and enter into labor contracts for
production at t=2.
•  At t=2 A second set of production flows is realized. All
accumulated production is consumed.
Technology, Preferences and Markets
To keep things as simple as possible, we consider a one-commodity
economy, in which, to fix ideas, the commodity is wheat.  To produce
wheat, farmers need labor and wheat (land is not a scarce resource). On
any given farm there can be at most two wheat crops, one at date t=1
and the other at date t=2.
Technological assumptions
The production function on any given farm is given by4
where:
1. 
t x is period t wheat output,
2.  is a farmer-specific productivity shock (it can be interpreted as
either the farmer's ability or his land's fertility),
3. 
1 - t k is the amount of wheat planted (or invested) in the farm in
period  1 - t  (alternatively, 





t l is the quantity of labor employed in period  1 - t ; it includes
the farmer's labor plus the labor from 
1 - t l  workers.
Note that the only relevant productivity parameter is the farmer's
productivity type. Laborers' productivity types are irrelevant. This
feature captures in a stark way the idea that what matters foremost is
organizational and entrepreneurial talent.
Again for simplicity, we use the following piecewise-linear production
function:
This is the simplest function with diminishing marginal productivity of
labor (on any given farm). We use this production function to model a
competitive agricultural economy. To obtain strictly positive profits
in equilibrium, we need at least one scarce factor (here it is wheat)
and diminishing marginal productivity with respect to one of the more
abundant factors.
The function above exhibits diminishing marginal productivity of labor
whenever  1 < a , for then a marginal increase in labor produces an
increase in output of only aq when 
1 1 1
- - ‡ +
t t k l , as opposed to q  when
1 1 1
- - < +
t t k l .
This production function also exhibits decreasing (or, more precisely,
no) returns to scale beyond the level of wheat investment  1 > k , so that
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clear below, decreasing returns to scale are essential to inducing
wealthy farmers to lend wheat to poor farmers. The production function
is illustrated in figure 2.1, assuming  5 . 0 = a  and  5 . 3 = k .
The farmer-specific productivity shocks, q, are independently,
identically distributed and take the values  g a b q q q < £ 0  with
probabilities  b a g a b m m m m m - - ”1 , , , .  These three types of farmers are
introduced to provide a potential role for political intervention. The
good types  g q  may always remain solvent, the bad types  b q  would always
go bankrupt if they have borrowed wheat, and the average types  a q  may
go bankrupt only if there is an unfavorable macroeconomic shock.
We assume that farmers do not know their type at date  0 = t ; they are
all equally ignorant about their talents and expect an average
productivity of
g g a a b b m m m q q q + + = 0 . That is, not only can't lenders screen borrowers
according to type, but also borrowers can't use information about their
own types in deciding whether to borrow. At date  1 = t , farmers do learn
their individual types, but this information remains private to the
farmer. We also assume that the total population of farmers is large
enough that the proportions of farmer types in the population are
approximately the same as the probabilities  g b a m m m .
Besides farm-specific productivity shocks, we also introduce a common
“macroeconomic” shock, say, weather conditions.  This shock shifts the
values of the farm-specific productivity shocks. We denote this shock
as  } , { L H v˛ with state H occurring with probability l  and L with
probability
l - 1 . The productivity shocks are then fully described as 
v





The production function and productivity shocks completely describe the
technological structure of our economy.
Assumptions on Preferences and Endowments
We assumed identical risk-neutral preferences, mostly for technical
convenience. It is worth pointing out, however, that risk-neutrality
combined with limited liability induces behavior, contracting
arrangements, and qualitative features similar to risk-aversion. Also
for simplicity we assume that all consumption takes place at the end of
the second period.
Each farmer, consequently, maximizes expected life-time wealth.
We assume there are M  farmers, each able to supply costlessly one unit
of labor in each period. Farmers differ only in their endowments of
wheat.
Some are rich and are the potential lenders or employers; others are
poor and are the borrowers or laborers. There are N wealthy farmers6
with per-capita endowment of wheat  1 > W  and  N M -  poor farmers with
0  endowment. Farmers know their endowments at  0 = t . We assume the poor
are substantially more numerous than the rich. Specifically,
) 1 ( W N M + > . In addition, we assume
Under our technology, this assumption guarantees that:
1.  bad types, if not defaulted, will remain as farmers rather than
work for a wage  g aq .
2.  bad types will never make any additional investment at  1 = t , and
3.  Only good types will hire additional labor.
Assumptions on Contracts and Markets
Rich farmers face the following decision at date  : 0 = t  Should they use
their wheat to hire poor farmers as laborers, or should they invest it,
either in lending to poor farmers or in adding capital to their farm
via increased k? Reciprocally, poor farmers have the occupational
choice decision: Should they borrow and remain independent farmers, or
should they become laborers?
Although both markets could be open in equilibrium, we demonstrate
existence of an equilibrium where only the credit market is open at
0 = t 1.
Such situations arise when all poor farmers prefer to borrow and work
on their own farm rather than working as laborers, and all rich farmers
prefer to lend than to hire workers at the prevailing equilibrium
market terms. At date  1 = t  the same two markets might be open. But, as
we shall explain, under the contractual assumptions made in our model
only the agricultural labor market is open at this interim stage. There
is no market for land, because we consider an economy where land is
abundant, but wheat and labor are relatively scarce. Such an economy is
a fairly realistic representation of much of North and South America,
circa 1800. A model with a market for land would be more realistic, but
the basic economics of the more elaborate model would be essentially
the same as in our simpler setup. We make the following assumptions
about the enforceability of these contracts:
•  Credit contracts: A farmer can lend wheat in exchange for repayment
at date  1 = t . We assume that the macroeconomic shock is not
describable in a contract or verifiable by the courts, so that the
repayment cannot be conditioned on the realization of the shock. In
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addition, wheat output on any given farm is not observable, let
alone verifiable. These two assumptions immediately imply that a
debt contract must simply be the borrower's promise to make a unit
repayment of D at  1 = t  and the debtor's right to foreclose the farm
in case of default (see Hart and Moore (1994, 1998) and Bolton and
Scharfstein (1990, 1996)). We assume that at  1 = t  it is not legally
possible for a farmer to acquire some other piece of land and
continue to produce there, unless he has repaid his debts. Thus by
foreclosing on the debtor's land, a creditor can prevent the debtor
from continuing production. This threat will induce the farmer to
repay his debts when he can. The borrower does have an incentive to
repay, for otherwise he would lose his second-period output. The
unit repayment D at date  1 = t  is, therefore, like the purchase by
the debtor of the right to continue producing wheat on the land.
Because there is no production beyond date  2 = t , there is no
incentive for the borrower to repay a loan at that date. In
anticipation, the creditor will insist that repayments take place
only at date  1 = t . If the debtor does not produce enough wheat to
repay D at date  1 = t , he is forced to default and the creditor
forecloses. At that point the debtor simply runs away with what
wheat he has and becomes an agricultural laborer. As will become
clear, in equilibrium there is no gain to the creditor from
renegotiating the debt contract and allowing the debtor to stay and
produce on his land.
•  Employment contracts: Just as with debt contracts, there is an
enforceability issue with labor contracts. We make wage contracts
enforceable by requiring a simultaneous exchange of work for wages.
Laborers are paid when, figuratively, the seeds are sown or the soil
tilled. That is, they are paid before output is realized.  This
completes the description of the economy with no political
institutions. As we shall see, such an economy may give rise to
excessively high bankruptcies at date  1 = t , when the economy is hit
by a large negative macro-shock. This outcome is due to the
contractual incompleteness of debt contracts, which precludes state-
contingent repayments. To overcome this inefficiency the farmers in
this economy may be willing to set up political institutions that
can intervene ex-post to suspend, delay, or cancel debt repayments.
Because political decisions are made ex-post, after the macro-shock
is realized and the individual farmer types are learned, political
institutions can serve as a mechanism to remedy the contractual
incompleteness of debt contracts. A potential drawback of such
institutions, however, is that they may undermine the proper
enforcement of debt contracts ex-post. We now turn to a description
of these institutions.
Political Institutions
The political institution we consider is majority voting on either debt
moratoria or bailouts financed with proportional consumption taxes. The
vote takes place at  1 = t , after production is realized but before debt
repayment or default takes place. We consider the effects of
restricting the franchise to those with invested and of allowing the
size of the majority needed to enact a moratorium or a bailout to be
larger than a simple majority. Both moratoria and bailouts have adverse8
selection problems. For example, as a farmer's wheat production is
private information, good farmers may choose not to repay during a
moratorium.  Consequently, alternative institutions that reduce adverse
selection might be preferable. Specifically, individual debtors might
be able to apply to an independent authority, say a bankruptcy court,
for leniency. The bankruptcy court would be able to learn, at a cost,
the type of the debtor and the macro-shock. Repayment would be adjusted
to the realization of the macro-shock.  Bankruptcy courts were
notoriously costly mechanisms in the 19th century (Balleisen, 1996) and
remain somewhat so today.  In any event, we defer analysis of
bankruptcy and other institutions for future research.
In addition to investigating equilibrium under moratoria, bailouts, and
the base case of no political intervention, we compare the relative
efficiency of the institutions.  This comparison would suggest what
institution might be chosen ex ante, behind a “veil of ignorance” where
endowments, productivity types, and the macro-shock are all unknown.
We also consider institutional choice at an interim level where
endowments are known but the productivity and macro-shock are not.
No aggregate uncertainty
In this section we assume that  L v =  with probability one  ) 0 ( = l , so
that there are no aggregate shocks. When there is no aggregate
uncertainty, there is no role for ex-post majority voting on debt
moratoria (or bailouts) as a way of completing debt contracts. At best,
voting on debt moratoria may help in correcting an ex-post pecuniary
externality in the labor market at  1 = t . At worst, majority voting on
debt moratoria will undermine the efficient enforcement of debt
contracts and introduce time inconsistency problems. As we shall
explain, anticipation of majority voting on debt moratoria may improve
ex-post efficiency by limiting indebtedness and therefore the number of
bankruptcies. Similarly, anticipated bailouts can improve efficiency
(both ex-ante and ex-post) by reducing the extent of credit rationing
at date  0 = t .
To see the effect of these two forms of political intervention in our
model, we first consider the benchmark economy with no political
institutions.
Economy without political intervention
The equilibrium we solve for is driven by our technological assumptions
of diminishing returns. It has the following characteristics:
1. At  , 0 = t  rich farmers invest  1 = k  on their own farms and lend
1 - W  to poor farmers.
2. The labor market at date  0 - t  shuts down, because it is more
profitable both for the rich to lend than to hire laborers at the
going market rate, and for the poor to borrow wheat and till
their own land than to become laborers.9
3. The equilibrium repayment rate in the loan contract is such that
bad and average types cannot repay. Thus, at date  1 = t , both bad
and average poor farmers become laborers. Rich farmers get a unit
repayment of  D m g .  To simplify the analysis we shall suppose
that rich farmers have a well- diversified loan portfolio so that
D m g  can be taken to be a sure repayment. This assumption is not
entirely realistic, but it is innocuous and convenient.
4. At  1 - t , bad and average rich farmers remain as farmers but
neither increase their investment nor hire laborers.  Good poor
farmers plow back all their net earnings to increase investment
to  . k k pg <  They hire  1 - pg k  laborers.  Good rich farmers increase
investment to k  and hire all remaining laborers.
5.  Laborers at  1 = t  work on  g q  type rich and
poor farms and earn equilibrium wage
That is, laborers earn their marginal product on good farms.
6. At  , 0 = t  a poor farmer borrows:
Note that, since  N M >    . 1 ), 1 ( < + p k W
7. The equilibrium repayment rate is given by the maximum incentive
compatible repayment at  1 = t .
Below we determine the conditions under which such an equilibrium
holds. We begin by considering good poor farmers' incentives to
repay their debt. We proceed to determine conditions under which
average and bad farmers default, and we address the issue of
renegotiation. We then consider rich farmers' decision to lend to
poor farmers or employ them as agricultural laborers. We close
this section by deriving the aggregate wheat output in
equilibrium.
•  Good farmers' incentives to repay: In the equilibrium we solve for,
poor farmers borrow  p k  for a repayment  p Dk  at date  1 = t , which they
repay only if they turn out to be good farmers. These good-type
borrowers derive output  ) 1 ( p g p g k k - +aq q from their initial
investment at date  0 = t . They can possibly expand production further
by increasing their capital investment and hiring labor at date
1 = t .  They can also choose to default on their loan, keep their
N M
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first period output, and work as laborers in the next period.  The
repayment terms D must be incentive-compatible with their not
defaulting.  To see the intuition of the following analysis,
consider the special case of  0 = a .  In this case, the good poor
farmer cannot earn anything as a laborer in the second period.  Thus
the lender can demand all of the first-period output, so D  =  g q .
Now for  0 < a , the borrower's ability to earn wage income in the
second period forces the lender to lower D and leave the borrower
some surplus, which is reinvested in the farm.  For sufficiently
large a , the surplus is large enough for labor to be hired.
Specifically, under our technological assumptions, second-
period output for sufficiently low D is:
The first term in the expression above represents the output
obtained by increasing capital to 1, at which point the capital
fully matches the farmer's own labor.  The numerator of the
bracketed portion of the second term is the amount of wheat
available for investment after the debt has been repaid and capital
increased to 1.  Beyond one unit of capital, the farmer will match
capital and labor2.  The cost of a unit of capital and a unit of
labor is the denominator.  To keep things as simple as possible we
shall restrict attention to parameter values such that
Under this assumption, Bolton and Rosenthal (1999) show that the
equilibrium repayment,  * D , for which the good farmer's incentive
constraint binds is such that
forD given by:
                                                                
2 The bracketed expression indicates that good poor farmers are
sufficiently constrained financially that they cannot expand capital
beyond k .  Satisfying this constraint may require additional
restrictions on the
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This is the repayment in our equilibrium, as at date  0 = t  there is
excess demand for loans at that rate. Poor farmers would like to
expand investment beyond  1 < p k , but there are not enough funds
available to cover their investment demand. Repayment rates cannot
increase to clear the market, as any higher repayment would not be
incentive compatible.
•  Average and bad farmers' incentives to default and debt
renegotiation: Bolton and Rosenthal (1999) show that average farmers
will default unless the repayment rate is below D
)
, where
and that bad farmers will default unless the repayment rate is below
D ~, where.
This inequality differs from the previous one since, by assumption,
1 < b q     and “bad” types do not increase their capital.
We therefore assume that the  i q  and a  are such that
). 2 (
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Note that this necessary condition for our equilibrium is satisfied
when  g q  is large relative to  a q  and  b q .
•  Borrowers ex-ante expected payoff: Because bad and average types
default at date  1 = t , run away with their first-period wheat
production, and earn a wage  g aq  by working as agricultural laborers
in the second period, a poor farmer's expected payoff at date  0 = t ,
denoted  p R , is
•  Rich farmers' investment and employment decision}: Consider next the
rich farmers' investment decision. Note first that rich farmers
would never want to lend more than  1 - W , because the marginal
return on capital  1 < k  invested on their own farm is at least
D mg > q . But they would want to lend  1 - W  if they cannot hire any
additional labor, because the first-period marginal return on
capital  k < 1  would be zero (by our assumptions).
They would not want to expand investment on their farm and hire
additional
labor if by lending  p k  they can expect a higher net return than by
investing an additional  p k  on their own farm. That is, if
or
where w denotes the minimum wage at which a rich farmer can hire a
poor farmer.  Note that the rich farmer's second period production
decision is the same whether he decided to hire laborers in the
first period or not. Therefore his first-period decision whether to
) ) 1 ( (
) ) 1 ( (
1
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g p b p b b


















































employ or lend is entirely determined by the relative first-period
return of the two contracts.
Given that poor farmers can borrow and work on their own farm, they
will consider working as agricultural laborers instead only if the
wage exceeds the payoff from borrowing, or
Assuming the lowest possible equilibrium wage prevails,
Substituting for  p R  and w and substituting  * D  for D, a rich
farmer prefers a credit contract to an employment contract if and
only if
 Note that conditions  ) 1 . 3 (  and  ) 2 . 3 (  are mutually compatible for a
subset of the parameter space and both hold when  ) ( a g q q -  is large
enough and a is commensurately small), so that our equilibrium
exists for this subset of  parameters.
•  Equilibrium wheat production: The economy's total wheat output in
this  equilibrium is then given by (see Bolton and Rosenthal, 1999
for details)
at date  1 = t ,  and
p g R w ‡ +aq
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at date  2 = t .
To summarize, in our equilibrium the good poor farmers plow all
their first period surplus back in their farm and good rich farmers
take up the remaining labor supply. There may be misallocation of
labor ex-post, as a fraction of laborers only produce  g aq  when they
could produce more elsewhere. This misallocation is partly due to
liquidity constraints of good poor farmers, which result in those
rich farmers with the highest ability to pay crowding out the poor
farmers with the highest marginal returns from labor.  Moreover, if
the number of defaulted farmers is too great for them to all be used
efficiently on good farms, it would be more efficient to have some
defaulted farmers remain as independent farmers.
On the other hand, this equilibrium results in ex-ante efficient
allocation of resources, as all available capital is used at the
highest expected marginal (and average) productivity q .
(Although poor farmers have less capital than rich ones, capital
could not be reallocated in a manner that would increase total
expected output.  This is a consequence of our production function.
With other production functions, the possibility of default would
lead to an inefficiently small transfer of capital from rich farmers
to poor.)
Economy with political intervention
The equilibrium without political intervention produces potentially
massive defaults by average and bad poor farmers.  When the number
of defaults is large, political pressure builds to introduce some
form of relief for the unfortunate. This relief can be in the form
of additional subsidies or tax breaks; government guarantees on new
loans or, possibly, even new government loans; debt moratoria; and
finally bailouts.  We analyze the latter two forms of government
relief to debtors. The main difference between a moratorium and a
bailout is that under a moratorium no government transfers are
required, whereas under a bailout the government raises taxes to
repay debts. A moratorium is simply a form of debt cancellation and
amounts to a direct ex- post transfer from creditors to debtors. A
bailout aims at repaying existing debts of poor farmers by raising
taxes on all citizens, that is, both creditors and debtors; it
amounts to an indirect ex-post transfer from solvent debtors to
creditors in our model3.
Relief can be introduced if a majority of voters support it.  The
relief granted is non-selective.  That is, the relief cannot be
conditioned on the productivity type of the farmer.  All farmers can
vote on whether to introduce some form of debt relief at date  1 = t ,
                                                                
3 In equilibrium, all agents have positive pre-tax returns.  As we use a
proportional tax on consumption, all agents have strictly positive
final consumption in equilibrium.
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following the realization of crops and each farmer's acquiring
private information about his own type. We focus on simple majority
rule; we comment briefly on the effect  of supra-majority rule.
Debt Moratoria
For economic efficiency, debt moratoria should be targeted only to
certain types of farmers and should be limited to the amount of debt
these farmers cannot repay. In practice, it is unfortunately
difficult both to discriminate between types and to limit the scope
of debt forgiveness. Once a moratorium is proposed, political
support for the initiative is maximized by including all debtors in
the scheme and by forgiving 100% of their debts. More precisely, any
farmer who would vote for partial cancellation of the debt would
prefer total cancellation to partial cancellation.  Accordingly, we
shall begin by considering a vote on 100% debt relief for all poor
farmers. We start with the case where a debt moratorium is
unanticipated at date  0 = t . In a second step we solve for the
equilibrium at date  0 = t  when debt moratoria are anticipated.
Winners and Losers from a Moratorium
To see who will support such an initiative, we must first consider
the effects of the moratorium on the labor market equilibrium at
date  1 = t .  Suppose that the population of bad poor farmers is
relatively high, so that
Then Bolton and Rosenthal (1999) show that the labor market
equilibrium following a moratorium will be such that Z  bad poor
farmers become laborers for good (rich and poor) types at
equilibrium wage  ) 1 ( p b p b k k - +aq q  and the remainder stay of their
farm.  At that wage all average poor farmers remain on their land
and expand investment to  1 = k .  Average and bad rich types do not
expand investment.   No average or bad type hires labor.  Good rich
types expand investment to k  but good poor types are liquidity
constrained in expanding.
Under this scenario the moratorium creates a positive pecuniary
externality for bad and average poor farmers, who see their second-
period wheat income increase from  g aq  to, respectively,
) 1 ( p b p b k k - +aq q  and  a q . These farmers therefore clearly favor a
moratorium. Note that this pecuniary externality is at the expense
of good farmers. Therefore all good rich farmers would be opposed to
this initiative even if the moratorium were limited only to bad and
average poor farmers (and therefore did not involve a direct loss in
debt repayments). All rich farmers would, a fortiori, be opposed to
.
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a moratorium that includes also the solvent good poor farmers. The
latter would support a moratorium if the gain in debt forgiveness is
greater than the increase in the wage bill, or if
This inequality will holds for sufficiently large  g q .  In this case,
there would be  ) ( N M -  voters in favor of a moratorium.  There would
be a majority in favor of the moratorium ex-post.
Ex-post efficiency of moratoria
The moratorium always increases ex-post efficiency, as measured by
total wheat output. Indeed, by allowing defaulting farmers to stay
on their farm, the moratorium improves the allocation of labor at
date  1 = t . Under our assumptions, it is efficient to have all bad
farmers in excess of
g Mm k ) 1 ( -  as well as all average defaulting farmers remain on their
farms. An unanticipated moratorium equilibrium achieves this.  The
only remaining inefficiency is that good poor farmers are liquidity
constrained and cannot expand to k .  The general observation here is
simply that as a result of the moratorium there can no longer be any
distortions on the real economy resulting from nominal debt
obligations. In other words, moratoria increase aggregate production
through redistribution from rich creditors to poor borrowers. Thus
the main (potential) problem with moratoria is not ex-post
efficiency but ex-ante efficiency, when moratoria are anticipated.
Ex-ante equilibrium with anticipated moratoria
When moratoria are anticipated, they give rise to credit rationing.
Indeed, rich farmers would never lend if they expected a moratorium.
Now, by lending to fewer poor farmers, rich farmers might guarantee
that the number of debtors will not exceed the number of creditors,
so that in a vote comprising only debtors and creditors they would
have a majority to defeat any moratorium. But voting is not
restricted to debtors and creditors, and the outcome of the vote
will depend on how the remaining agricultural laborers vote.
From the perspective of a laborer, a moratorium is always good news
since it reduces the supply of labor. Thus laborers always weakly
favor moratoria. If they vote in favor when they are indifferent,
there will always be a winning majority for a moratorium, so that
the credit market shuts down at  0 = t . In that case the economy
achieves a lower aggregate output in both periods of
.
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at date  1 = t 4,and
at date  2 = t .5
On the other hand, if laborers vote against moratoria when they are
indifferent, an equilibrium with credit rationing obtains at date
1 = t
where  N M n - <  poor farmers get credit of  1 = p k  (the efficient
scale for a poor farmer working on his own). The number n is such
that a majority
against debt moratoria exists at date  1 = t  (i.e.,  M n £ 2 ).
This equilibrium obtains only if laborers are indifferent. That is
the case only if the equilibrium wage at date  1 = t  is unaffected by
an increase in supply of labor from defaulting poor farmers. In
other words, this equilibrium obtains only if  g w aq = , whether a
moratorium is approved or not.  Consequently, the equilibrium with
credit rationing is extremely fragile and depends entirely on the
assumed piecewise-linear structure of the production technology. Any
small change in equilibrium wage resulting from a change in supply
of labor would result in a majority in favor of moratoria ex-post
and would lead to a shutdown of the credit market.
An alternative way of ensuring that a majority against moratoria
exists ex-post is to lower the repayment for some farmers to 
# D  so
that the cost of repaying would be less important than the increased
labor costs under a moratorium.  In other words, 
# D  solves
Good farmers borrowing at 
# D  would also oppose the moratorium.  If
they were sufficiently numerous, a majority could emerge to oppose a
moratorium.  Under this scenario, ex-post moratoria impose a
                                                                
4 Note, in particular, that  ) ( k W N -  of the initial endowment is not invested at date  0 = t .
5 At date  1 = t , all bad and average rich farmers hire  ) 1 ( - k  laborers at wage  g aq  to produce additional
output of respectively  ) 1 ( - k b q  and. Because they only need to increase the labor force to reach
maximum efficient scale, and because by assumption  g b aq q > , this choice is profitable. All other
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constraint on lending terms but do not necessarily imply inefficient
credit rationing ex-ante.
Implementing a two-tier loan structure is not feasible with
decentralized lending and uncertainty about the number of borrowers
who will be good types.  Free-riding will cause a two-tier structure
to unravel.  A two-tier structure could be supported if there were a
single financial intermediary who would make the appropriate trade-
off between increasing the probability of a  moratorium and the
benefit of obtaining  * D  rather than 
# D  from borrowers at the
margin.  The solution to the maximization problem of the
intermediary is provided in Bolton and Rosenthal (1999).  When M  is
large, the probability of a moratorium will be close to, but not
exactly, 0 .  Thus, there is a small chance of observing a moratorium
on the equilibrium path.
The equilibrium with an intermediary leads to greater ex post
efficiency even when the effects of a moratorium are fully
anticipated and the moratorium does not occur.  The gain comes from
good poor farmers who have borrowed more cheaply; they can use
retained earnings to expand at  1 = t .
Interestingly, if the threat of a moratorium resulted in  a D q £
# ,
then even average types would repay their loans ex-post.6
In this case, there is an additional ex-post efficiency gain with
the political institution of a moratorium. The threat of a
moratorium allows average poor farmers to keep their farms.
Restricting voting rights
When repayment rates low enough to produce a majority opposed to a
moratorium are not profitable for the rich and when credit rationing
is infeasible, credit markets collapse when moratoria are
anticipated.  To avoid a complete shutdown of the credit market at
date  0 = t , it would then be necessary to restrict voting rights one
way or another. In fact voting rights were generally restricted at
the beginning of the nineteenth century. Only land owners and
sufficiently wealthy men were allowed to vote. In our model,
restricting the franchise to those having capital, either endowed or
borrowed, would improve ex-ante efficiency. It would take out
altogether the votes of agricultural laborers and thus make lending
to a maximum number of  n )
 poor farmers possible, where
N m n g = - ) 2 1 ( )
.
Another means of making moratoria more difficult is to require more
than a
simple majority for enactment under direct democracy.  The same
objective
                                                                
6 The fact that average types will repay for low values of 
# D  makes reduced  terms more feasible for
creditors.  If only good types repay, we must have  1
# > D mg .  But if both good and average types repay,
it sufficies that  1 ) (
# > + D m m a g .19
can be accomplished in a representative democracy with a bicameral
legislature with property interests overrepresented in one chamber.
Measures to make a moratorium more difficult, however, are not
desirable when the threat of a moratorium leads to an equilibrium
with a lower interest rate than when no political intervention is
permitted.
To summarize, when there is no aggregate uncertainty, a debt
moratorium will always improve ex-post efficiency.  But allowing for
voting on a moratorium will cause lenders to adopt strategies that
always result in a majority in opposition to a moratorium.
Moratoria do not occur on the equilibrium path.  The threat of a
moratorium undermines credit markets.  Ex-ante efficiency is reduced
if credit rationing occurs.  The threat of moratoria may lead to
lower repayment rates, however, leaving ex-ante efficiency unchanged
and ex-post efficiency improved.
Bailouts
We suppose again that farmers vote on whether to bail out defaulting
debtors at date  1 = t , following the realization of crops and the
revelation of farmer types.  As with moratoria, it will be difficult
to target the bailout to only average and bad poor farmers.
Accordingly, we shall consider a vote on a bailout of D for all
poor farmers financed with a proportional tax on consumption at date
2 = t . That is, we suppose that the government is able to run a
deficit at date  1 = t  by borrowing against receipts from a tax on
accumulated consumption in the second period.
The reason we consider a consumption tax is that consumption is
easier to
monitor than income. Just like the creditors, a government will have
difficulties observing or verifying the actual revenues generated by
each
individual farm, so that an income tax would give rise to widespread
evasion. We assume that all consumers are taxed at tax rate t . The
maximum tax the government can set is  1 < t .
If  taxing consumption were as difficult as taxing income the
government
might have too small a tax base to finance a bailout.  That may be
one
reason why debt moratoria appeared to be the preferred choice of
relief in
the Panic of 1819.  Nevertheless, suppose that an efficient
consumption tax (or an inflation tax) is available and consider who
would support or oppose such a tax ex-post.
Winners and Losers from a Bailout
Ignoring the tax implications of the bailout, average and bad poor
farmers would benefit from a bailout to the extent that they both
get higher wages and have the option to remain on their farm.20
Similarly, good poor farmers might be against the bailout if it
results in too sharp an increase in wages.
But poor farmers also have a reason to oppose bailouts: the extra
tax burden. Rich farmers, on the other hand, now have a reason to
favor bailouts: their loans get repaid! As long as the repayment of
their debts exceeds the additional tax burden and wage bill, they
will support a bailout. Because the tax burden is spread over the
entire population, creditors always end up getting more from a
bailout than the added tax burden on their own consumption. The rich
thus favor a bailout if it does not entail too steep a rise in
wages.  As our technological assumptions imply that only good types
hire labor, only these types would be likely, among the rich, to
oppose a bailout.  Note also that these types bear a
disproportionate share of the bailout.
In sum, if the wage effects of the bailout are small, rich creditors
favor a bailout. Some, if not all, poor farmers on the other hand
oppose it. The bad poor farmers - who would have defaulted and
become agricultural laborers anyway - mainly see their tax bill
increase and are therefore opposed. The average poor farmers oppose
the bailout if the value of the option of staying on their land is
less than the increase in taxes.  Finally, the good poor farmers
oppose the bailout because their tax burden is likely to exceed the
nominal value of their debts. If wage effects are large, all good
framers may oppose a bailout while all average and bad types support
it.
Thus the political coalitions that form for bailouts are very
different than for moratoria.
Ex-post efficiency of bailouts
Unanticipated bailouts have efficiency properties very similar to
those of moratoria. By removing the nominal debt overhang they allow
bad poor farmers and average farmers to make efficient economic
decisions. Following the bailout, these farmers would decide to
become laborers only if they are more productive elsewhere than on
their farm. As for the other farmers, their investment decisions are
unaffected at date  1 = t  because they get taxed only at date  2 = t  and
because the consumption tax is neutral with respect to investment
decisions. Admittedly, the ex-post efficiency of bailouts depends to
a large extent on the method of taxation used to finance the
bailout. If taxes are sufficiently distortionary, then bailouts
would be dominated by moratoria.
Ex-ante equilibrium with anticipated bailouts
To fix ideas, suppose that wage effects are small so that all rich
lenders
and average poor farmers favor a bailout, but bad and good poor
farmers oppose it. Suppose, in addition, that a majority favors a
bailout,  .




>  This implies that lenders are always fully
repaid ex-post, so that they would have every incentive to lend ex-
ante. In other words, the ex-ante response to bailouts is the21
opposite of moratoria.  Bailouts give rise to more rather than less
investment.
In fact, anticipated bailouts raise issues of existence of
equilibrium. To
see this, note that all poor farmers seek to borrow k  no matter how
high the required repayment D, because they do not have to repay
out of their  own money anyway. Now, if  q > D  the rich prefer to
lend all their endowment rather than investing in their own farms.
But even if rich farmers lend everything, aggregate demand for loans
exceeds supply, for by assumption  M W N < + ) 1 ( .  Consequently, an
equilibrium may obtain only at the maximum rate D  that the
government can actually repay.  Such an equilibrium is sustainable,
however, only if the bailout rule gives priority to bailing out
debts of lower denomination.  In that case no lender would sign a
lending contract with  D D >  when all other contracts specify
repayment D .
To characterize this equilibrium further, suppose that all poor
farmers
borrow
in exchange for a unit repayment of  q > D  at date  1 = t . Then the
total bailout bill for the government at date  1 = t  is
Denote by x the total accumulated output at date  2 = t .  In
equilibrium
we must then have
or
(assuming that the government can costlessly tax all private
consumption at
date  2 = t  as well as borrow costlessly on international markets).
As long as equilibrium lending terms D  are greater than q , rich
farmers prefer to lend all their wheat rather than investing on
their farms. At these terms, poor farmers obtain a strictly positive
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which is more than anything they can hope to get by working as
agricultural laborers in both periods. (Indeed, they would prefer to
borrow more at these terms.)
Bolton and Rosenthal (1999) characterize in more detail the
existence of this ex-ante equilibrium with maximum lending. Note
that ex ante efficiency follows from  1 <
b
p k .  An ex-post bailout may
improve both ex-post and ex-ante efficiency because of the
inefficiency of the debt contract under no bailout.  This contract
is inefficient because creditors are unable to appropriate all the
output produced ex-post on poor farms with their investment. A
bailout allows for a potentially superior collection technology ex-
post by complementing the creditors' debt-collection technology with
the government's taxation technology.
Comparing bailouts to moratoria, we conclude that bailouts--in a
world with costless tax collection--are more desirable than
moratoria.  We also observe that bailouts here occur “along the
equilibrium path”, whereas moratoria are almost always an “off the
equilibrium path” possibility that constrains the equilibrium
outcome. We shall see in the next section, however, that with
aggregate uncertainty moratoria can occur on the equilibrium path.
Perhaps more interestingly, with aggregate uncertainty the
equilibrium with bailouts may be such that in some states total
accumulated debts are too high for the government to be able to bail
out everybody. In other words, the anticipation of bailouts in some
states may give rise to a massive default in other states.
Aggregate and Individual Uncertainty
In this section we extend the model by assuming that  1 0 < < l . Recall
that l  denotes the probability that state H  occurs and  l - 1  the
probability that state L is realized. In state H , productivity of
all farmers is higher than in state L.  With aggregate uncertainty,
ex-post majority voting on debt relief may complete debt contracts,
which are constrained to be independent of the state of nature. To
keep the analysis tractable we shall make the extreme assumption in
this section that  0 = a  (and that  1 >
j
a q
 for  L H j , = )7.  Although
this assumption eliminates many interesting effects, it does help in
highlighting the main observation of this section that ex-post
political intervention can play a beneficial role in completing debt
contracts.
Economy without political intervention
                                                                
7 In the previous section with  0 = a  we had  . 1 aq q + < < a  Clearly, with  0 = a  one of the inequalities
has to be dropped. It is most natural to drop the second one.23
As in the case without aggregate uncertainty we focus on an
equilibrium where:
1.  Rich farmers invest 1 on their own farms and lend the remainder







2.  The labor market at date  0 = t  shuts down. In addition:
3.  Because  0 = a  there is only limited demand for labor at date  1 = t .
4.  We distinguish the two states by deriving an equilibrium repayment
rate in the loan contract D such that bad and average types
cannot repay in state L, but only bad types default in state
H .
With the restriction that  0 = a  the conditions for such an
equilibrium to obtain are straightforward to derive. We begin by
considering poor farmers.
•  Poor farmers' ex-ante expected payoff and ex-post default
decisions: In state L good farmers repay their loan if and only
if  D
l
a ‡ q  and  average and bad farmers cannot repay if 
l
a D q > .
Similarly in state H  good and average farmers repay their loan
if and only if  D
H
a ‡ q  and “poor” farmers cannot repay if
H
b D q > .  If good poor farmers retain some earnings after the
debt repayment they invest to expand capacity and possibly to
hire labor. Because  0 = a , labor is essentially free and good
farmers would want to expand up to k . Thus, assuming that
a poor farmer's ex-ante payoff from borrowing  p k  is given by:
To ensure that lenders do not wish to renegotiate the debt
contract in either state we now assume that:
1.  in state L the 
L





























































2.  in state H  the 
H
i q  are such that,
Consider next rich farmers' lending decisions.
•  Rich farmers' lending decision: As in the case with no
aggregate uncertainty, rich farmers would never want to lend more
than  1 - W .  Bolton and Rosenthal (1999) show that a rich farmer
prefers credit
contracts lending  1 - W  to a labor contract if  and only if
Again, this condition is jointly satisfied with our renegotiation-
proofness  conditions above for a non-empty subset of the parameter
space (e.g., for 
H
a g m q ,  and 
H
g q large enough).
•  Equilibrium wheat production in each state of nature: In state L the
total equilibrium output is now simply
at date  1 = t , and
at date  2 = t . In state H  total output is
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at date  2 = t . Recall that  0 = a  (and laborers are essentially free),
so it now pays both good and average type rich farmers to expand
their farm capital up to k  at date  1 = t . Similarly, good poor








g k k q q - + > ) 1 (  we obtain the expression above).
Economy with political intervention
As in the previous section we consider in turn debt moratoria and
bailouts.
Debt Moratoria
We shall restrict attention to parameter values such that a majority in
favor of moratoria emerges only in state L. More precisely, we shall
determine an equilibrium repaymentDsuch that good poor farmers oppose
a moratorium in stateH to get L Then as long as
) 1 )( ( ) ( g g m N M N m N M - - > + -  there will be a majority against
moratoria in state H  and a majority in favor of moratoria in state L
(as  N N M > - ) (  by assumption).
In state H , a good poor farmer would oppose a moratorium if the
benefit in cheap labor outweighs the cost of repaying the loan.
Assuming that the population of bad poor farmers is relatively high, so
that8
the equilibrium wage following a moratorium will equal  p bk q . Therefore
good poor farmers oppose a moratorium if
 or,
Thus, if we make the assumption that
                                                                
8 A weaker, necessary and sufficient condition is straightforward but
algebraically messy.
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an equilibrium repayment of 
H
a D q = *  would give rise to no moratorium in
state H  and a moratorium in state L.
In that moratorium equilibrium, the poor farmers' ex-ante expected
payoff is
then










b b k m k m k m q q q q q l + + + + - 9
Rich farmers prefer to lend  ) 1 ( - W instead of hiring laborers if
and only if
or,
Thus as long as  ), 1 )( ( ) ( g g m N M N m N M - - > + -  and conditions  ) 1 . 5 (  and
) 2 . 5 ( hold, the equilibrium with moratoria is such that:
1.  rich farmers continue to lend at repayment terms 
H
a D q = * ,
2.  no moratorium is voted in state H , with good and average types
repaying their loans
3.  a moratorium is voted in state L.
This equilibrium dominates the equilibrium without political
intervention in both ex-ante and ex-post efficiency. Ex-post efficiency
is improved in state L by allowing average and bad poor farmers to stay
on their farms and thus remain productive. Ex-ante, the likelihood of
state L occurring (l ) is sufficiently small that it does not affect
rich farmers' lending decisions, so that efficiency is not impaired.
Interestingly, the possibility of an ex- post moratorium involves a
transfer of rents to poor farmers both ex-ante and ex-post. The reason
that poor farmers also benefit ex-ante has to do with the threat of
default or a moratorium in state H , which can be avoided only by
                                                                
9 Note that an implicit assumption here is that  k k p
L
g £ + ) 1 (q .
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giving poor farmers better lending terms ex-ante. As suggested in the
introduction, political intervention here plays a critical role in
“completing” financial contracts that are constrained to be state-
independent.10
Bailouts
The most interesting case here is where a majority is in favor of a
bailout in state L and against in state H . In this case the
equilibrium with bailout is similar to that with a debt moratorium as
long as l  is small. To  see this, note first that the ex-ante
equilibrium outcome with anticipated  bailout in state L is then the
same as the equilibrium outcome with no  bailout; that is, rich farmers
continue to lend  ) 1 ( - W  at equilibrium  repayment terms 
H
a D q = * . The
reason that equilibrium terms do not exceed 
H
a q   is simply that higher
terms would trigger default by average poor farmers in  state H , and
therefore would not be profitable. More precisely, if l  is large the
anticipated increase in repayments in state L (through bailouts) is
outweighed by the anticipated fall in expected repayments in state H .
In sum, anticipated bailouts in state L do not affect the ex-ante
equilibrium and they lead to an ex-post welfare improvement in state L,
just as with moratoria. In this case, the sharp distinctions between
the effects of bailouts and moratoria observed in the previous section
disappear with the  introduction of aggregate uncertainty.
The Political Economy of Debt Relief in the Panic of 1819
The empirical motivation for our model came from the observation that
state legislatures in the United States frequently voted debt moratoria
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Most notably,
many states intervened in private debt contracts as a result of the
severe downturn known as the Panic of 1819.  Between October 1818 and
April 1822, Tennessee, Kentucky, Maryland, Illinois, Pennsylvania,
Missouri, Louisiana, and Vermont passed stay laws imposing debt
moratoria. Rhode Island made it more difficult to seize the assets of
debtors by repealing “summary process”. Minimum appraisal laws passed
in Indiana, Pennsylvania, and Kentucky made it more difficult to sell
debtor assets at auctions.11
At the same time, Congress provided for delayed repayments of land
debts to the federal government.  On the other hand, proponents of
federal relief for private debts lost. Although the United States
constitution explicitly gives bankruptcy powers to the federal
government, no bankruptcy law existed between 1803 and 1842.
                                                                
10 Recall that repayments cannot be made contingent on aggregate shocks
because courts cannot verify whether state H  or L has occurred. The
state of nature is “certified” only by the outcome of majority voting
on debt moratoria. If no majority in favor materializes, it becomes
common knowledge that state H  has occurred (or that state L has
occurred if a majority in favor of a moratorium is formed).
11 Rothbard 1962, 196-197.28
In this section, we analyze the politics of the Panic in light of our
model.
We begin by arguing that the economy of the United States in the period
around 1820, particularly in the South and the West, was closely
approximated by our model.  We next show that frontier states, where
new settlers had borrowed to finance agricultural investment, were much
more likely to provide debt relief than were older states and that
congressional preferences on relief of land debts parallel those
leading to debt moratoria at the state level.  We end by examining why
there was no federal legislation for relief from private debts.
Most of the data we bring to this effort are political in the form of
legislation passed by the states or roll call votes cast by senators
and representatives in Congress.  As Domowitz and Tamer (1997) point
out, there does not appear to be economic data before 1830 that would
provide evidence of private defaults.  On the other hand, there are
ample data on political outcomes.  These outcomes can be informative
about the preferences of agents in the economy and the reaction of
these agents to macro-shocks.
The Economy at the Time of the Panic
The major cause of the Panic, according to North (1961, 182-183), was
the collapse of the world price for cotton.  Between January 1918 and
June
1919, cotton prices fell by more than 50%.  Cotton, in turn, dominated
both American exports and the economy of the South.  The decline of
cotton prices also affected the West, as the West's economy was largely
driven by sales of wheat and livestock to the South.  Bulk commodities
were transported to the South on the Mississippi and its tributaries.
Neither canals nor railroads crossed the Appalachians before 1825.  The
Northeast provided non-bulk manufactured goods, banking, shipping, and
other services to the other regions.  (Douglass North defines the South
at this time as Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North
Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia; the West as Illinois, Indiana,
Kentucky, Missouri, Ohio, and Tennessee; and the Northeast as all other
states.)
Both the South and the West correspond roughly to the technological
structure of our model.  In a nation that was still almost entirely
rural, the West and western portions of the South were nearly entirely
so, 99% rural in 1820.  Although the Atlantic seaboard portion of the
South was “only” 95% rural, what little urban population existed was
mainly in the New England (10.5% urban) and Middle Atlantic (11.3%)
states.  In a national labor force of 2,900,000 people, more than two-
thirds worked on farms.12
Given the low technological level of agriculture at this time, it is
not too far-fetched to regard the South and West as single-commodity
regions with labor (often in the form of slaves) as the major input
factor.
Commodity prices are made endogenous when new land is brought into
cultivation.  Some of the drop in the cotton price reflects an
expansion in production from 157,000 bales in 1812 to 377,000 in 1821.
But over a longer run, cotton production was able to expand
tremendously while whites prospered in the “Cotton Kingdom”.  By 1859,
                                                                
12 United States Department of Commerce, 1975, hereafter HS, 134.29
5,337,000 bales were produced.13 Clearly the world market price was also
determined by shifts in foreign demand.   World price shocks bear
similarity to the macroeconomic shock in our model.
An important omission from our model is a market for land.  The
thirteen former colonies had ceded all their western land claims to the
federal government.  Almost all of the Louisiana Purchase was
government land. Sale prices and property rights for government-
controlled virgin land was then and is today (as in Brazil) an
important issue of economic policy.  Some advocated that the government
charge a zero price and only regulate quantities.  But until 1860, the
government sold land.  Rising prices for cotton and other sources of
prosperity stimulated land sales at the end of the Napoleonic Wars.
Receipts from land sales in the South increased from $332,000 in 1815
to $9,063,000 in 1818.  In the West, the jump was from $2,078,000 to
$4,556,000.14
With the Panic, land sales fell abruptly, never regaining the 1818
level in the South and passing it in the West only in 1835.  The
receipts were in large part only down payments, some of which had been
borrowed in private markets.  Private debt was also used to finance
investment on the land, including slave purchases.15 In addition, many
citizens in the South and West were debtors to the federal government,
with payments due on the outstanding balance of land purchases.  Before
the passage of the Land Act of 1821, the federal government was owed
some $23,000,000.16  The land debt to the government exceeded annual
federal expenditures (around $20,000,000 in 182017), and was an
appreciable fraction of the government debt of $90,000,000 in 1821.18
When the Panic occurred, easy private credit had been extended by the
frontier branches of the privately owned Second Bank of the United
States.
Credit; tightening by the Philadelphia headquarters led to substantial
resentment on the frontier.
Debt Relief at the State Level
The pressure for debtor relief led to legislation mainly in frontier
states.
We specify the frontier as Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky,
Tennessee,
Missouri, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, as distinct from the
states on the Atlantic seaboard that were once British colonies.  Six
of these nine  frontier states were listed by Rothbard (1962) as
                                                                
13 HS, 518.
14 North, 1961, 256.
15 In our model there is no market for land (there is an abundance of land), so that our story does not quite
fit these events. It would be innocuous, however, to introduce a market for land in our model. At date
0 = T  all this would mean is a higher investment outlay for farmers; as for date  1 = T ,  default will give
rise to excess supply of land and consequently to a collapse of property prices as seen in the Panic of 1819;
the main complication with introducing land in our model is the possibility of strategic behavior by rich
buyers in the market for land, such as waiting for panics to buy land on the cheap. It is beyond the scope of




providing some form of debtor relief in response to the Panic.  In
contrast, only 4 of the remaining 15 states passed a “stay law” or some
other measure. ( 10 . , 70 . 3
2
1 < - = value p c . This chi-square statistic and
those later refer to the  2 x 2  contingency table of, for example,
Law])   No   [Law, Frontier]x - Non   Frontier, ([ .
Because the great preponderance of new agricultural investment was
taking place in frontier states and because these states were
overwhelmingly rural, debtors were likely to dominate the electorate
there.  In addition, the frontier was more likely than the old states
to have universal male suffrage rather than suffrage restricted on the
basis of property holding or wealth.19   It is thus not surprising that
most of the ex post intervention occurred on the frontier.
Note, however, that debt relief was largely a northern and border state
matter.  Of the eight states in North's southern region, only 2,
Louisiana
and Tennessee, both on the frontier, granted debt relief, against 8 of
the
16 other states.  Indeed, debt relief measures were passed in 4 of the
9
New England and Middle Atlantic states, which, in many historical
accounts,
are regarded as pro-creditor.
The absence of debt relief in the South may be the expression of a
reaction in the South to stay laws that were passed by southern state
legislatures immediately preceding the formation of the United States.
McCoy notes, with reference to James Madison, “Madison vehemently
condemned ... popular legislation ... in the wake of a commercial
depression that overtook much of the country in the mid-1780s.  Paper
money laws, so-called “stay” laws that offered relief to debtors, laws
that impugned the sanctity of contracts; all may have expressed the
immediate will of a people suffering the consequences of economic hard
times, but they just as clearly violated the rights of both individuals
and minorities.  And in Madison's judgment, he and other critics of
this debtor legislation were defending much more than the specific
interest of creditors... By wantonly disregarding the rules of property
and justice that raised men from savagery to civilized order, these
laws threatened to bring republican government in America into profound
disrepute.”20
Madison's economic conservatism may have carried over more broadly to
state legislatures in the South, which were dominated by property
owners in the older regions of the states, the high endowment types in
our model.  Within the South, one-white-man, one-vote, applied only in
the four frontier states.21 In Virginia, about half the white males were
disenfranchised by a property requirement.  Moreover, the legislature
                                                                
19 Of course, suffrage requirements would become endogenous in an extended version of our model.  We
can only speculate that, during the transition from colonial status to democracy, creditors or property
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on the frontier, yeoman farmers-debtors were likely to have had more weight when state voting
requirements were adopted upon entry to the United States
20 McCoy, 1989, 41.
21 Freehling, 1989, 164.31
was not reapportioned to reflect greater population growth beyond the
Tidewater.22
South Carolina had universal white male suffrage but severe property
qualifications for office holding; the state Senate was malapportioned
to give control to the older coastal region.23
Suffrage and apportionment may be an important part of the story of why
stay laws and other form of debt relief were more prevalent in frontier
states.  Not only may a larger fraction of the population have been in
default in those states, but also debtors may have had more political
voice there.
Relief for Purchasers of Land
The initial federal reaction to massive defaults by those buying land
on credit was the land law of April 24, 1820.  For future sales, it
eliminated sales on credit but reduced the minimum purchase price to
$1.25 per acre from $2 per acre.  At the same time, forfeiture on
outstanding debt was delayed until March 21, 1821.  Just before this
deadline, on March 2, another act was passed.   A debtor could either
repay at a 35% discount (getting the price reduction of 1820), give up
part of his land in payment for the remainder, or extend the time
required to pay.  This bailout/moratorium was, like the S&L bailout of
the 1980s, a substantial transfer between regions.  The beneficiaries
were concentrated on the frontier.  The costs to the Treasury were
borne by the entire nation.
There were many roll call votes on the floor of Congress on the 1820
and 1821 land bills.  The 1820 bill was largely non-controversial in
the Senate and passed on a 31-7 vote.  Although the bill granted a one
year moratorium on outstanding debt, its provisions banning future
sales on credit were not to the frontier's liking.  Amendments were
introduced to make the law more lenient.  One, by Edwards of Illinois,
reduced the purchase price to $1 an
acre.24
It failed 11-24.  Of the 11 favorable votes, 10 came from the frontier.
Only 5 frontier senators cast negative votes.
) 001 . , 12 . 15 (
2
1 < - = value p c . All 8 of the frontier states (Missouri not
yet admitted) had at least one senator voting for cheaper purchase
prices.  This voting pattern was repeated on other votes.  For example,
amendments by Edwards to give purchase preferences to squatters and by
Noble to eliminate the cash payment requirement both failed 8-28.  Of
the 8 favorable votes, 7 came from the frontier.  Of the 7 votes cast
against passage of the bill, 6 came from frontier senators dissatisfied
with the bill's lack of leniency.
The House of Representatives also had a lopsided majority in favor of
the 1820 bill.  Only one amendment led to a recorded roll call.  As in
the Senate, frontier representatives wanted the cash payment provision
eliminated.  The non-frontier states voted overwhelmingly, 123-7, to
maintain cash payment, and they were joined by the entire Ohio
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delegation (6-0).  Elsewhere on the frontier, representatives sought,
12-6, to eliminate the new requirement for cash payment.  The bill then
passed.  The bill won overwhelmingly in the older states, 122-10, but
lost on the frontier, 11-13.  The frontier received a temporary
reprieve for its debt and lower prices, but much stricter terms for
future purchases.
The 1821 bill was more lenient.  In the Senate, Lowrie of Pennsylvania
failed, by only one vote, to reduce the discount for prompt payment
from 37.5% to 25%.  All 15 senators from the frontier voted against the
amendment, which was supported by the older states 20-6.
) 001 . , 52 . 22 (
2
1 < - = value p c . Although the amendment vote clearly
delineates the frontier's desire for leniency, passage, as in 1820, was
non-controversial.  The House also voted on the 37.5% discount with the
Anderson amendment on Feb. 27, 1821.25 The amendment passed 72-62; the
20-4 margin on the frontier was pivotal.  The bill itself passed 97-40,
winning 21 of the 24 votes from the frontier.
To summarize the discussion of voting on relief for land debts, there
was a national consensus that the Panic required a policy adjustment
for land debtors.  Within this consensus, there was a sharp debate over
the degree of leniency, with close roll call votes in 1821 on
amendments defining the terms of the new policy.  Disappointed in 1820,
the thinly populated frontier obtained better terms in 1821.
No Federal Relief for Private Debt: The Failure to Pass a
Bankruptcy Bill
Although the federal government provided relief to those in debt to the
government, Washington failed to provide a fresh start or a breathing
spell to those in default on private debts, in contrast to stay laws at
the state level.
The inaction of the federal government is somewhat surprising, as the
Constitution adopted in 1787 clearly provided for federal bankruptcy
law powers.  Moreover, in contrast to many other aspects of the
Constitution, the bankruptcy clause was not in controversy during the
ratification process.  Before the enactment of a stable, permanent law,
bankruptcy laws were short-lived and served the purpose of writing off
severe downturns in the economy.  Creditors obtained very little in the
court proceedings (Balleisen, 1996).  Bankruptcy in the nineteenth
century therefore resembled a moratorium subject to the inefficiency of
court costs.  If we see bankruptcy as a moratorium, it is not
surprising that an interim conflict over bankruptcy law could develop
even if there was initially a widespread agreement that Congress could
enact bankruptcy laws.26
The Panic of 1819 occurred during the “Era of Good Feelings” when the
United States was virtually a one-party state.  The Jeffersonian
Democrat-Republicans were in control; despite the Panic, President
Monroe was reelected in 1820 by the Electoral College unanimously less
one vote. It is not surprising, given the political ascendancy of the
“left”, that no bankruptcy law was passed, even if the Jeffersonians
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26 See Berglof and Rosenthal, 1998, for details of the congressional politics of bankruptcy legislation in the
1840s and 1890s.33
were particularly strong on the debt-ridden frontier.  The bill under
consideration in 1822, for  example, was, in the view of Blair of South
Carolina, very similar to the 1800 law that the Jeffersonians had
repealed upon their taking control of both the executive and
legislative branches in 1803.27
In the 15th Congress, the Senate took no recorded floor votes on
bankruptcy.
 The House took just one, voting in February 1818 to postpone
consideration of a bill indefinitely.  The 16th Senate did pass a
bankruptcy bill by the narrow margin of a 23-19 vote on February 19,
1821.  Floor votes took place over ending imprisonment of bankrupts,
whether classes of debtors other than merchants should be included, and
whether the bill would apply to contracts written before passage of the
legislation.  The Senate bill was reported unamended to the floor of
the House by the Judiciary Committee,28 but, in 7 procedural votes
between February 28 and March 2, 1821, the bill was tabled.  The 17th
House had amendment voting on treatment of debtors other than merchants
and on whether creditor majorities would be needed to approve voluntary
bankruptcies.  No action took place in the Senate.  Substantive votes
did occur in the 18th and 19th Senates both on the issues that arose
previously and on the treatment of banks.  But neither the 18th nor the
19th House took any action.
The voting patterns on bankruptcy did not match those on the land debt.
There was no clear conflict between frontier states and the older part
of the country.  The old South was as opposed to a federal bankruptcy
law as the frontier South.  Data from the House votes indicate that the
main trading centers--New York, Philadelphia, Boston, and Charleston,
South Carolina--voted together, frequently in opposition to rural
districts in their own states.  Representatives of these trading
centers argued that it was especially necessary to provide a fresh
start to merchants who, unlike farmers, were more subject to
circumstances beyond their control, including domestic and foreign
political changes that involved uninsurable risk.29
Merchants, it was argued, also were heavily engaged in interstate
commerce and thus required a uniform national law.30 An advantage of a
national law would be to give geographically distant creditors as much
protection as that afforded to creditors near the debtor.31  Those
opposed to a national law objected strongly to the fresh start
provision, in large part because they foresaw substantial opportunities
for fraud.32 The arguments for a bankruptcy law made in 1818 were
remade, to no avail, in the 1821 and 1822 debates.33
Why did no bill materialize?  At this point, we can only suggest
several possible explanations.
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1) Amendments could be offered to provide differential treatment for
different classes of debtors, merchants, manufacturers, and banks.
Eligibility for bankruptcy could be determined by a debt threshold.
For example, during the 1818 debate in the House, it was proposed to
include merchants as well as bankrupts but to require $5000 in debt to
be eligible.  The aim of the threshold was to deter bankruptcy by very
small, artisan manufacturers, but the threshold caused the support of
small merchants to be lost.  The most divisive item was apparently a
provision that required an agreement of 2/3 of the creditors to permit
bankruptcy; some representatives preferred to allow debtors to declare
bankruptcy on their own.  All in all the House bill had 64 sections.34
As Speaker Henry Clay remarked, “it was very probable the bill would be
lost by the variance of opinion on some of its important details.”35
In such a setting, it can be difficult to construct a stable majority
combining a diverse set of groups.  To take a modern example, the
modern underpinnings of the banking industry in the United States, the
Glass- Steagall Act, were not changed legislatively between 1933 and
1999.  Kroszner and Strattman (1998) have recently argued that the
legislative status quo prevailed because banks, insurance companies,
and securities firms had distinct interests in changes from the status
quo.  Each interest group vetoed detrimental changes.  In summary, in
economies more diverse than that of our simple model, it may be
difficult to form majorities to change the status quo on bankruptcy.
2) One way to maintain the status quo is to use one house of Congress
to block a bill with majority support in the other house.  In the
Senate, each state had 2 senators indirectly elected by state
legislatures, but the directly elected House was apportioned on the
basis of population.  While New York, Virginia, Pennsylvania, and
Massachusetts had 25, 25, 23, and 22 representatives, respectively, the
five frontier states of Indiana, Illinois, Alabama, Mississippi, and
Louisiana each had only a single representative.  It could be difficult
to craft legislation that would garner a majority in both chambers.
3) The Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of stay laws only
in the late 1820s and thereafter.  In states where most of the debt was
owed to foreigners or lenders residing in other states, debtors may
have had a preference for keeping state institutions.  States' rights
arguments were invoked frequently in the congressional debate.36 Part of
the argument was that the bankruptcy clause in the Constitution was
intended not to extinguish contracts but to prevent debtors to evade
payment by moving assets across state lines.
4) If inter-state or foreign debtors in a state may have had an
interest in resisting federal intervention, intra-state creditors may
also have wanted to avoid federal intervention if they believed that
federal bankruptcy law would be more debtor friendly on intra-state
debt.  In particular, creditors in the old South may have had greater
confidence in their gentry-controlled state legislatures.
5) States' rights was connected with the slavery issue.  Concerns with
federal intervention on slave issues may have led to a preference for
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limiting federal intervention on other issues.  Representative Woodson
(KY), despite not mentioning slavery explicitly, did indicate that the
bankruptcy issue was bound up with a much broader debate about states'
rights.37
 In addition to a long-term concern over slavery, the role of the
federal government in economic matters was open to debate.  The federal
government was extremely small in 1820, with only 6,900, mostly
military, employees.38 The government provided defense and conducted
foreign affairs, collected taxes through the tariff, managed the
western lands, and ran the post office.  The uniform tariff policy
would be sharply disputed by John C. Calhoun and fellow South
Carolinians in the Nullification Crisis later in the decade.  Federal
bankruptcy courts would have represented an important expansion in
federal regulation.  (By contrast, when a stable bankruptcy law was
finally passed, in 1898, the Civil War had resulted in the abolition of
slavery and the acceptance of federal predominance over state
governments, one national and no state currencies existed, and federal
economic regulation had been accepted through the Interstate Commerce
Act of 1887 and the Sherman Anti-trust Act of 1893.)  In particular, a
federal role in bankruptcy would have decreased rents enjoyed by local
assignees, receivers, sheriffs, and auctioneers (Balleisen, 1996, 474).
Conclusion
With incomplete contracts, there is an obvious case for governmental
intervention in markets.  Contracts cannot be contingent on individual
productivity.  A consequence is that there are excessive defaults.  In
our setup, the total output of the economy would be higher if average
type defaulting farmers were allowed to remain on their land.  Contacts
also cannot be conditioned on the state of the economy.  In our
equilibrium with uncertainty about the state of the economy, average
farmers remain on their land in good times but default in bad times.
With state contingent contracts, the average type farmers would, for
some sets of parameters, be able to remain on their land in both
states.  Political intervention can remedy the inefficiencies that
arise from both sources of contractual incompleteness.  Not only is
aggregate production increased ex post but, ex ante, the total output
of the economy is increased by allowing for debt relief. The stay laws
observed in the Panic of 1819 might well have been an anticipated
response to aggregate uncertainty rather than an inefficient form of
expropriation that would deter future lending.
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